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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The Appellant ("Burghart"), a pro se incarcerated inmate, appeals the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order granting Respondents' motion to dismiss and dismissal of 
Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Statement of Facts 
Burghart is a presently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") by 
virtue of a judgment of conviction and order of commitment. (R., p.16.) Burghart is currently 
housed at the Idaho Correctional Institution Orofino ("ICIO"). (Id.) Burghart was convicted in 
1998 and sentenced to five (5) years fixed not to exceed twenty (20) years. (Id., p. 17.) 
Procedural History 
Burghart filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 23,2009. (R., p. 16.) 
In his Petition Burghart made four claims: 
(1) Given the statutory language "shall" in statue under Sass v. California Par. Bd. 
461 F3d 1123 and Martin vs. Marshall 448 FSupp 2nd 1143 Petitioner has a liberty 
interest in parole 5th & 14th Amendment. 
(2) The parole board showed no evidence under the "some evidence" rule 
guaranteed to prisoners in a disciplinary, which under Hill vs Superintendent, 
some evidence applies to the parole context. 
(3) State parole board would satisfy due process requirements in action on 
petitioner's application when board conducts hearings, considers inmate's 
circumstance, prior record, institutional record, future plans and advising their 
reason denying application. 
(4) The commission is arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional in their 
activities is why the Corrections budget went from $25 million in 1985 when 
Olivia Craven became director to $200 million now, because the parole board has 
went unchecked. 
(R., p. 18.) 
The district court issued an Order Directing Response and Notice of Hearing on 
December 29, 2009 directing that Respondents file a response within 60 days of the court's 
order. (R., p. 22.) The Respondents' filed their Response and Motion to Dismiss on February 
17, 2010. (R., pp. 26-35.) The Respondents' moved to dismiss the Petition for Burghart's 
failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (R., p.26.) 
Burghart filed a Reply to Respondents' Answer and Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus 
on March 1,2010. (R., pp. 36-39.) 
The district court held a hearing on April 2, 2010. (R., p. 40.) Both parties presented 
argument to the court. (rd., pp. 40-41.) The court granted Burghart an additional 10 days to 
supplement his Petition with paperwork regarding exhaustion of remedies. (Id., p. 41.) 
Burghart filed a Supplemental Attachment (Exhaustion) on April 7, 2010. (R., p. 46.) 
The Respondents' filed a Supplemental Response to Motion to Dismiss on April 12,2010. (R., 
pp.42-44.) 
The district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on June 1, 2010, granting 
the Respondents' motion to dismiss and dismissing Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. (R., pp. 45-51.) 
Burghart filed a Motion For Reconsideration and Motion to Leave to Amend Petition on 
June 11,2010. (R., pp. 53-59.) The Respondents' filed an Objection to Motion to Reconsider 
and Motion to File Amended Petition on July 13,2010. (R., pp. 60-64.) 
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on August 16, 2010. (R., 
pp. 66-70.) The district court denied Burghart's motion to amend and motion to reconsider. (R., 
pp.68-69.) Thereafter Burghart filed a Notice of Appeal on September 9, 2010. (R., pp. 77-81.) 
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ISSUES 
Burghart has a-sserted five issues on appeal as follo\X1S: 
1. Did Petitioner exhaust his administrative remedies? 
2. Unless denied, disputed or argued, petitioner's claims are deemed true for purposes of 
habeas corpus relief? 
3. Like a disciplinary proceedings, some evidence attached to the parole commission?! 
4. Arbitrary and capricious activities by the commission are unconstitutional?! 
5. Idaho Statute IC 20-223(c) creates a liberty interest in parole in using the word shall in 
statute. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in dismissing Burghart's Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus upon a finding that Burghart failed to state a claim for relief that denial of 
parole is a violation of Burghart's constitutional rights? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting the Respondents' motion to dismiss 





BURGHART HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DISTRICT 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISrvlISSING HIS PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
A. Introduction 
Burghart appeals the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order granting 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion ofthe court. 
Johnson, v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127,376 P.2d 704, 706 (9162); Brennan v. State, 122 Idaho 
911, 914, 841 P.2d 441,444 (Ct. App. 1992). When the court reviews an exercise of discretion 
in a habeas corpus proceeding, the court conducts a three-tiered inquiry to detennine whether the 
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Jd.; Sivak v. Ada County, 115 Idaho 
762, 763, 769 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Ct. App. 1989). If a petition is not entitled to relief on an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus, the decision by the petitioned court to dismiss the 
application without an evidentiary hearing will be upheld. Brennan, 122 Idaho at 917, 841 P.2d 
at 447. When a court considers matters outside the pleadings on an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary jUdgment. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 
118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990). 
When reviewing an order for summary jUdgment, the standard of review utilized by this 
Court is the same standard used by the district court in initially ruling on the motion. 
Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436 (2008). Under Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary 
judgment is to be rendered to the moving party if all the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
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on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In considering 
summary judgment the Court liberally construes all facts and all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party. A & J Canst. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684 (2005). 
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party may not rest 
on allegations in the pleadings, but must produce evidence by affidavit or deposition to 
contradict the assertions of the moving party. LR.C.P. 56(e); Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 
176 (1974). A non-moving party may not rely on general or conc1usory allegations unsupported 
by specific facts, particularly where opposing affidavits set forth specific and otherwise 
uncontroverted facts. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902 (1997). Rather, a party must 
provide factual details of specificity equal to those furnished by his opponent. Bob Daniels and 
Son v. Weaver, l06 Idaho 535, 541 (1984). "A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as 
to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary 
judgment." Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897 (2007) (emphasis added). Moreover, even 
disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when the non-moving party fails to establish 
the existence of an essential element of his of her case, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 
(1988), or when a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case on which he or she bears the 
burden of proof. State v. Shama Res. Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 270 (1955). 
C. The District Court Properly Dismissed Burghart's Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus 
For Failure To State A Claim For Relief 
In reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus to decide if the writ should issue and an 
evidentiary hearing be held the court must treat all allegations contained in the petition as true. 
Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964). In order for a court to have jurisdiction to 
grant a writ of habeas corpus, it must appear a violation of constitutional rights has occurred. If, 
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after treating the allegations as true, the court finds that they do not state a constitutional claim, 
the court must dismiss the petition without further hearing. Mitchell v. Agents of the State, 105 
Idaho 419, 670 P.2d 520 (1983). Although a petition for writ of habeas corpus differs somewhat 
from a typical civil complaint, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do apply to habeas corpus 
proceedings. Sivak v. Ada County, 118 Idaho 193, 795 P.2 898 (Ct. App. 1990). 
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) provides that a party may raise as a defense the failure of the opposing 
party to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A court may grant a motion to dismiss 
based on LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief. LR.C.P. 12(b)(6); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 129 Idaho 
171, 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, (1995). 
Under this standard, the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record 
viewed in its favor. Id. As to the proper standard to be applied to 12(b) motions, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that: 
On a motion to dismiss, the court looks only at the pleadings, and all inferences 
are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, l37 
Idaho 102, 10444 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) (regarding 12(b)(6) motions); Osborn 
v. United States, 918 f.2d 724, 729, n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990) (regarding 12(b)(l) 
motions raising facial challenges to jurisdiction. "[T]he question then is whether 
the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim which, if true, 
would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. State, 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (1996) (regarding 12(b )(6) motions); Servo Emp. Intern. V. Idaho 
Dept. of H. & W, 106 Idaho 756, 758, 683 P.21d 404, 406 (1984) (regarding 
12(b) challenges generally; Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729, n. 6 (regarding 12(b)(l) 
facial challenges). "[E]very reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a 
complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm 'n 
on Human Rights V. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217,506 P.2d 112, 114 (1973). "the 
issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Young, l37 Idaho at 104,44 P.3d 
at 1159. 
Owsley V. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 PJd 455,459 (2005). 
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In this case the district court should look to draw all inferences in favor of Burghart and 
seek to detennine whether he has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which, if true, 
would entitle him to relief, and whether he is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. 
As the following discussion will illustrate, even when all inferences are drawn in Petitioner's 
favor, it was proper for the district court to dismiss Burghart's claims. 
The Idaho Habeas statutes set forth certain requirements of the Petitioner when filing a 
Petition. Idaho Code §19-4205(4)(a) states that the Petition shall specify "the identity and 
address of the person or officer whom the prisoner believes is responsible for the alleged state or 
federal constitutional violations, and shall name the persons identified individually as 
respondents." Idaho Code § 19-4205(4)(d) also states that the petition shall specify "a short and 
plain statement of the facts underlying the alleged state or federal constitutional violation." Idaho 
Code § 19-4209(1 )( c) grants the court authority to dismiss a petition, if the court finds "the 
petition fails to state a claim of constitutional violation upon which relief may be granted." 
The district court granted the Respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis that Burghart 
failed to provide sufficient facts to support his allegations, allege conduct that would constitute a 
violation of his constitutional rights and that his reliance on Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) is misplaced. (R., p. 49.) Furthennore the district 
court stated that Sass v. Cal. Bd. Of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2206), Biggs v. 
Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir., 2003), Martine v. Marshall, 448 F.Supp.2d 1143 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) and Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) are inapplicable. (Id.) 
1. Does Burghart Have A Liberty Interest In Parole? 
Burghart argues in his Petition that he has a liberty interest in parole under Sass and the 
"some evidence" standard in Walpole applies to parole hearings. (R., p.17.) Burghart also argues 
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that the "shall" language in the statue creates a liberty interest pursuant to Sass and Martin. (Id., 
p .18.) The district court was correct in holding that the Burghart did not state a claim for relief 
Burghart has no liberty interest in parole and therefore does not have a constitutionally protected 
right to due process in a parole hearing. 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent 
right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence." 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Idaho courts have consistently held 
there is no right to parole. Izatt v. State, 104 Idaho 597, 661 P.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1983); Hays v. 
Craven, 131 Idaho 761, 963 P.2d 1198 (Ct. App. 1998). "The Idaho Supreme Court has concluded 
that Idaho statutes do not provide a legitimate expectation of parole, but merely the possibility 
thereof." Hays, 131 Idaho at 764 (citing Izatt, 104 Idaho at 600). Furthennore, "Idaho's statutory 
parole scheme allows for parole only in the discretion of the Commission for Pardons and Parole." 
Vittone v. State, 114 Idaho 618, 619, 759 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1988); Idaho Code § 20-223(c) ("A 
parole shall be ordered when, in the discretion of the commission, it is in the best interests of 
society, and the commission believes the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the' obligations of a 
law-abiding citizen.") "[IJt has long been settled-that the possibility of parole is not protected by 
due process and that inmates have no constitutional right to due process in parole hearings." 
Drennon v. Craven, 141 Idaho 34, 36, 105 P.3d 694 (Ct. App. 2004). Because Idaho law does not 
give Burghart a liberty interest in parole, he is precluded from asserting a due process claim 
challenging the Commission's decision denying him parole. 
Petitioner attempts to argue around this clearly established law by relying on Sass v. 
California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006). In Sass, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained that whether the denial of parole violates a prisoner's due process 
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rights depends on whether the relevant state statute governing parole creates a liberty interest by 
using mandatory language. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127. As clarified by the court, if state law does 
not create a liberty interest in parole, then a due process challenge is not allowed. Id. Because 
Idaho law does not create a liberty interest in parole, Petitioner's reliance on Sass is misplaced. 
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho decided a series of 
cases addressing the same issue as raised by Burghart. As explained by the court in Fox v. 
Craven, 2007 WL 2782071 (D. Idaho 2007): 
It remains the law that an inmate can bring a procedural due process challenge to 
a parole decision only where there is a state-created liberty interest in parole. See 
Board of Pardons v. 482 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1987); Sass v. California Board of 
Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir.2006) .... Therefore, before an 
inmate may bring a due process claim arising from a parole denial, he must show 
that there is a state-created liberty interest in parole. 
Id. at *4. The district court further explained 
In Banks v. State of Idaho, 920 P.2d 905 (Idaho 1996), the Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed the liberty interest question. The court noted that the Idaho sentencing 
statue, I.e. § 19-25l3, uses the nonmandatory words "[t]he offender may be 
considered for parole or discharge at any time during the indeterminate period of 
the sentence." The Banks Court held that, as a result of the statute's language, in 
Idaho "parole is not an automatic right or liberty interest." (Citations omitted.) 
the Banks Court acknowledged the existence of I.C. § 20-223, which governs 
parole commission decisions and contains the phrase "a parole shall be ordered 
when .... " However, the court apparently did not find the statute's "shall" 
language controlling in the liberty interest analysis, although that section is nearly 
the same as the language deemed mandatory in Greenholtz and Allen. Rather, the 
Idaho Supreme Court relied on I.C. § 19-25l3-which governs sentencing-noting 
that it does not contain mandatory language, but instead states that "[t]he offender 
may be considered for parole or discharged at any time during the indeterminate 
part of the sentence." 
Id. at *5. "All Idaho cases are in agreement that the parole statutes are not mandatory and that 
there is not liberty interest in parole in Idaho." Id. The court in Balla v. Idaho State Board of 
Correction, 869 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit noted that "§ 20-223 does not 
establish any entitlement to parole" and cited Allen and Greenholtz. ld. The court then reviewed 
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Idaho's parole statutes and related cases before concluding: 
In Sass, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the principle that "a State's 
highest court is the final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes" to 
determine whether a state parole statute was mandatory or permissive. 461 F.3d 
at 1127. Because the Idaho Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, this Court is 
bound to follow its interpretation of state law. Parole is not mandatory in Idaho, 
resulting in no liberty interest in parole. This conclusion, in tum, prevents an 
inmate from pursuing due process claims arising from a denial of parole. 
Id. The court applied the same analysis in Abbott v. Craven, 2007 WL 2684817, *5 (D. Idaho 
2007) and Muraco v. Sandy, 2007 WL 1381795, *7 (D. Idaho 2007). Based on the foregoing 
analysis, the district court properly held that Burghart's reliance on Sass is misplaced. 
Burghart relies on Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. 
Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) for the proposition that the "some evidence" standard in Hill attaches 
to the Commission in a parole proceeding. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Burghart argues that he was 
deprived of due process when the Commission's decision was not supported by "some 
evidence." (ld.) Burghart contends that the Respondents did not address this issue. (Id.) 
The Respondents' moved to dismiss the Petition for failure to state a claim and did 
address Burghart's claims in that the Respondents argued that Burghart had not stated a claim for 
relief and therefore was not entitled to any relief. 
The district court held that the Walpole case was inapplicable. (R., p. 49.) In Walpole 
the issue before the court was "whether revocation of an inmate's good time credits violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the decision of the prison disciplinary board 
is not supported by evidence in the record." Walpole, 472 U.S. 447. The court concluded that 
"where good time credits constitute a protected liberty interest, a decision to revoke such credits 
must be supported by some evidence." Id. Walpole is distinguishable from Burghart's case 
because in Walpole good time credits were being revoked and the decision was being made by 
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the prison disciplinary board. Walpole has a liberty interest in the good time credits that were 
being revoked. In this case, Burghart is claiming his sentence is being extended by the 
Commission and that he is being denied parole by the Commission. The Commission makes 
determinations about parole and it is not a disciplinary board. Burghart has not liberty interest in 
parole therefore he has not right to due process. See Izatt v. State, 104 Idaho 597 (Ct. App. 
1983). Nothing is being revoked from Burghart therefore the state has not created a liberty 
interest in his parole. For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
holding that the Walpole case was inapplicable. 
D. The District Court Properly Found That Burghart Failed To Exhaust His Administrative 
Remedies Against Respondent Carlin Prior To Filing A Lawsuit 
Respondents moved to dismiss the claims in Burghart's Petition against Respondent 
Carlin on the basis that Burghart failed to exhaust his administrative remedies: (R., pp.30-32.) 
The district court during a hearing on April 2, 2010 granted Burghart additional time to 
supplement his Petition with paperwork indicating exhaustion of remedies because Burghart had 
marked the box in his Petition indicating that he exhausted his administrative remedies. (R., 
p.4l.) The Plaintiff provided supplemental documentation on April 7, 2010 in which he 
provided the district court with a document from his parole hearing and not from any 
administrative appeal. (R., p.46.) The district court held that Burghart checked the box asserting 
he exhausted his administrative remedies and was attaching documents to prove so but no 
documents were filed. (R., p. 49.) Burghart was given additional time to produce documentation 
that he exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id.) The district court held that the documents 
produced by Burghart did not pertain to exhaustion of remedies and dismissed part of his claim 
with prejUdice. (Id.) 
Idaho Code § 19-4206(1), provides that: 
11 
Unless a petitioner who is a prisoner establishes to the satisfaction of the court 
that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, no petition for writ of 
habeas corpus or any other civil action shall be brought by any person confined in 
a state or county, or in a state, local or private correctional facility, with respect to 
conditions of confinement until all available administrative remedies have been 
exhausted. If the institution, or state, local or private correctional facility does not 
have a system for administrative remedy, this requirement shall be waived. 
(Emphasis added). This statute requires that any prisoner in Idaho who brings an action in state 
court exhaust "all available administrative remedies" as a prerequisite to bringing a civil action. 
This prerequisite may be waived only if the Petitioner is in imminent danger of physical harm or 
if the prison does not have a grievance system in place. Burghart does not allege in his Petition 
that he is in physical danger. 
Similarly, on the federal level, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), as codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that 
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or 
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that failure to exhaust one's administrative remedies, as required by 
the PLRA, is an affirmative defense on which defendants bear the burden of proof. Wyatt v. 
Terhune, 315 F.3d 11 08, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003). As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
such a defense should be asserted by way of a motion to dismiss, while at the same time stating 
that the Court may consider matters beyond the pleadings. Wyatt, at 1119-1120. 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of exhaustion of remedies in Booth v. 
Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Booth involved a prison inmate who sought monetary damages, 
which were not available through the prison grievance system. Booth held that exhaustion of a 
prison's administrative remedy process was mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
regardless of whether the relief sought was available. 532 U.S. at 741. Booth expressly rejected 
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an interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which would have required an effective remedy to 
actually be available. The majority opinion noted that prior to enactment of an amendment in 
1995 which created the present version of the statute, a court had discretion to require a state 
inmate to exhaust "such ... remedies as are available" but only if those remedies were "plain, 
speedy and effective." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed.). Booth, 532 U.S. at 739. But, under the 
present statute, a court lacks discretion to dispense with the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 739. 
The Supreme Court concluded that exhaustion is a procedural requirement, rather than a 
substantive or result-driven one, and that "exhaust," in the context of the statute, requires 
exhaustion of a process, not exhaustion of possible relief. Id. Thus, the phrase "such 
administrative remedies as are available" "requires a prisoner to exhaust the grievance 
procedures offered, whether or not the possible responses cover the specific relief the prisoner 
demands." Id. at 738. 
The exhaustion requirement serves an important purpose, as the Supreme Court held in 
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 623-25 (2002): 
Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve 
the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections 
officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the 
initiation of a federal case. In some instances, corrective action taken in response 
to an inmate's grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the 
inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation ... In other instances, the internal 
review might "filter out some frivolous claims" ... And for cases ultimately 
brought to court, adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that 
clarifies the contours of the controversy. 
(citations omitted), cited in McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002). 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Burghart's claims in his 
Petition against Respondent Carlin for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The law is 
settled, that in order to proceed in a habeas corpus action, Idaho Code § 19-4206(1) requires that 
l3 
any prisoner in Idaho who brings an action in state court exhaust "all available administrative 
remedies" as a prerequisite to bringing a civil action. Burghart in his appeal argues that the 
Commission cannot be grieved according to their own IDAPA rules. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The Respondents do not argue that Burghart needed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
against the Commission; the Respondents argue that Burghart failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies against Respondent Carlin. (R., p. 32.) Even after the district court gave Burghart the 
opportunity to supplement the record on the exhaustion issue, Burghart failed to provide 
evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies. The district court properly exercised its 
discretion in dismissing the claims against Respondent Carlin for failing to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons and well settled Idaho law, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in dismissing Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Accordingly, 
Respondents respectfully request that the Court affirm the dismissal of Burghart's Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DATED this _l_ day of April, 2011. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
~b~ 
KRISTA L. HOWARD 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _\_ day of April, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF IDOC RESPONDENTS to be served on: 
Randolph Burghart #55288 
ICIO 
381 W. Hospital Dr. 
Orofmo, Idaho 83544 
Via Us. Mail 
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